Imitation and autism. Beyond the controversies, the pedagogical “exceedance” of the theatrical action

Since ancient times, imitation is considered one of the main and early (Meltzoff, Moore, 1977; 1997; Meltzoff 2002) ways of learning. Today, this statement has acquired a further scientific validity from neuroscience, especially thanks to the discovery of mirror neurons (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996). However, when we address this issue into the entangled world of autism, such considerations are no longer so linear because of an amount of contradictory evidences. Some scholars, in the light of ASD traits related to social interaction deficits, believe that people with autism can have a deficit of imitation (e.g. Broken Mirror Theory). But recent studies reject this perspective reporting that treatment based on imitation can be effective in helping people with ASD improve their social skills (Iacoboni, 2008). Moreover, Ingersoll’s work on spontaneous imitation in ASD (2012; 2011) emphasizes the importance of new, practical approaches for people with autism. Or Nadel experiments (2011) with new observational and empirical devices to detect the imitative skills of autistic children. Starting from this second body of theories and according to Aristotele’s first definition of theatre as mimesis praxeos (Poetics, VI, 1449b 24-28), the paper aims to analyze, from the perspective of personalist pedagogy, how performance-based practices and their mimetic modalities could be considered as an interesting venue for autism research in order to develop creative and embodied educational strategies to enhance a range of social and executive skills of minors with ASD